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CHAPTER 6
Propaganda 2.0 : Herman and  
Chomsky’s Propaganda Model in the Age 
of the Internet, Big Data and Social Media
Christian Fuchs
1. Introduction
Herman and Chomsky’s book Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy 
of the Mass Media1 was published nearly 30 years ago. Today, not only has the 
Soviet Union disappeared, but we have also experienced the progressive inten-
sification of neoliberalism and financialization, the 2008 world economic crisis, 
austerity, constant growth of inequalities, and the extension and intensifica-
tion of nationalism, new racism, and xenophobia. The news media are in crisis. 
Advertising has shifted from print towards targeted online ads. Today we not 
only have the World Wide Web and mobile phones, but also Big Data, Google, 
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Flickr, Instagram, Wikipedia, blogs, etc. have 
become important means of information and communication. Given these 
changes, the question arises if and how we can make sense of the propaganda 
model in the age of the internet and social media.
Herman and Chomsky summarise the propaganda model in the following words: 
The essential ingredients of our propaganda model, or set of news ‘filters’, 
fall under the following headings: (1) the size, concentrated ownership, 
owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms; 
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(2) advertising as the primary income source of the mass media; (3) the 
reliance of the media on information provided by government, busi-
ness, and ‘experts’ funded and approved by these primary sources and 
agents of power; (4) ‘flak’ as a means of disciplining the media; and (5) 
‘anticommunism’ as a national religion and control mechanism. These 
elements interact with and reinforce one another. The raw material of 
news must pass through successive filters, leaving only the cleansed 
residue fit to print. They fix the premises of discourse and interpreta-
tion, and the definition of what is newsworthy in the first place, and 
they explain the basis and operations of what amount to propaganda  
campaigns.2
The key aspect is that wealth and power inequalities shape what is consid-
ered newsworthy, what gets reported, and what is heard, read and watched. 
It should be noted that the propaganda model is not a theory. A theory of 
propaganda and ideology requires a systematic theory of society and capital-
ism, in which the role of culture, ideology and propaganda is clearly defined. 
It is for example unclear why exactly there are five elements and how they 
are theoretically justified. Moreover, entertainment and the spectacle as a fil-
ter that displaces and colonises political communication is missing from the 
model. Jürgen Habermas argues that entertainment is part of the process of 
the feudalisation and de-politicisation of the public sphere: ‘Reporting facts 
as human-interest stories, mixing information with entertainment, arranging 
material episodically, and breaking down complex relationships into smaller 
fragments – all of this comes together to form a syndrome that works to depo-
liticize public communication.’3 It is therefore best to view the Propaganda 
Model (PM) as a not necessarily complete list of elements that are ideologi-
cally influencing factors on the agenda of the news media. The fifth element 
of anti-communism should probably best be generalised in terms of dominant 
ideologies that influence the media.4 Also Joan Pedro suggests to term the fifth 
dimension ‘dominant ideology’.5 In the thirty years since the publication of the 
book, especially the neoliberal ‘belief in the “miracle of the market” (Reagan)’6 
has become dominant.
In respect to criticisms arguing that the model is functionalist and does not 
take resistance and contradictions into account, Herman argues that ‘the sys-
tem is not all-powerful,’7 that there are ‘uncertain and variable effects’ and ‘con-
testing forces.’8
2. Social Media and Power
One often hears that social media and the decentralised character of the internet 
overcome hierarchies and foster a participatory culture and democratic commu-
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nication. Edward Herman has voiced scepticism about this assumption: ‘Some 
argue that the internet and the new communication technologies are breaking 
the corporate stranglehold on journalism and opening an unprecedented era of 
interactive democratic media.’9 He argues that new technologies ‘permit media 
firms to shrink staff even as they achieve greater outputs, and they make possible 
global distribution systems that reduce the number of media entities.’10
2.1 Size, Ownership, Profit Orientation
The dominant social media platforms have concentrated ownership. Google- 
co-founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin own 42.4% and 41.3% respectively 
of Alphabet’s class B common stock. Page controls 26.6% of the voting power; 
Brin 25.9%.11 Facebook owner Mark Zuckerberg controls 85.3% of the compa-
ny’s class B common stock and 60.1% of the voting power.12 Social media is also 
a highly concentrated market: Google controls 71% of the world’s searches, and 
Facebook and its subsidiary WhatsApp account for 48% of users worldwide of 
the top 10 social media platforms.13
Both Google searches and the Facebook news feed are very important sources 
of news today. In respect to the 2016 US presidential election, the group of 
18–29-year-olds considered social media the most important news source:14 For 
all who are 30 or older, TV news was the most important source. Taking the 
entire adult population together, 78% used television during one week for learn-
ing about the election, 65% used digital information sources (48% news websites; 
44% social networks), 44% used the radio, while 36% read print newspapers. The 
data indicate that the internet does not substitute but merely complements tra-
ditional news sources. Among younger people, however, it is the most important 
source of news.
Algorithms determine the ranking of Google’s search results and Facebook’s 
news feed. The centralised ownership of these companies (from which users are 
excluded), combined with the huge market share of users the two companies 
hold and the fact that both platforms are important news sources, results in the 
circumstance that ownership also means control over algorithms that deter-
mine news sources for a significant part of the population. Both algorithms are 
intransparent; they are corporate secrets. As capitalist companies, Google and 
Facebook want to protect themselves from competition. Factors that play a role 
in Facebook’s news feed algorithm e.g. include your closeness to a person post-
ing content (closeness meaning how regularly you interact with them through 
messaging, likes, etc.), the type of a post or the achieved popularity of a post.15 
It is also possible to boost a particular post by paying for it, or to buy a spon-
sored ad that targets a specific group of users’ news feeds. Google’s PageRank 
algorithm ranks web pages using various criteria, such as the number of sites 
that link to them – a weight is given to each link. So, if the New York Times links 
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to your web page, then this link is likely to have a higher weight than the link 
your best friend posts on her/his site. Also, on Google is it possible to purchase 
sponsored links that are boosted to prominent screen positions.
The discussion shows that social media’s ownership matters in several 
respects. Firstly, social media markets tend to be highly concentrated. Private 
ownership locks users out from the control of algorithms that determine the 
priorities of how search results and news are presented. The specifics of the 
algorithms are secret because of the secret nature of intellectual property and 
because capitalism’s laws of competition foster secrecy.
Online advertising is, however, contradictory. On average, users only click 
on one out of one thousand advertisements.16 And even then, it is uncertain if 
they really stay on a linked page and if they buy something there. The effects of 
targeted online advertising may therefore be overstated. Because of the fetish-
istic idea that algorithms and Big Data allow perfect interest-based targeting, 
advertisers gain the impression that they can sell commodities via social media. 
If it turns out that this is a misconception, then targeted advertising may lose 
credibility and social media capitalism’s financial bubble may burst and cause 
the next dot-com crisis.
2.2 Advertising
Figure 6.1 shows statistics about the development of the distribution of global 
advertising spending.
The data shows that the share of online advertising has increased from 17.9% 
to 28.3% in the years from 2010 until 2015. During the same time, news paper 
advertising revenue has dropped significantly and its share has decreased from 
20.5% to 14.8%. Online advertising has globally become the second most 
Fig. 6.1: The development of global ad spending’s distribution.17
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important form of advertising after television advertising. Especially in times 
of crisis, online advertising seems to appear to advertisers as the more secure 
option because it is individualised through extensive surveillance of online 
behaviour and algorithmically targeted. Traditional news journalism is in a 
crisis of a commercial character, notably in relation to its advertising revenues.
Google, Facebook and Twitter are not just sources of news and informa-
tion. These websites are also among the world’s largest advertising agencies. 
They are in the business of selling targeted ad space as a commodity and 
derive their revenues almost exclusively from targeted advertising.18 Her-
man and Chomsky remarked in an interview about the PM in respect to the 
second filter that Google and Yahoo ‘are heavily dependent on advertising 
revenue.’19 Given their high numbers of users, platforms such as Google and 
Facebook can expect to attract large shares of ad investments seeing that 
companies are interested in reaching a large number of people from their 
targeted audience. Social media advertising allows both broad reach and 
precision targeting.
Herman and Chomsky argue that advertisers prefer to run ads during TV 
programmes that are ‘culturally and politically conservative,’20 i.e. entertain-
ment and spectacle oriented programmes and news and discussion pro-
grammes that have a right-wing, conservative and pro-capitalist bias. The 
effect is that media that focus on entertainment and spectacles tend to attract 
more advertisements, whereas independent media ‘suffer from the political 
Fig. 6.2: Example of a promoted tweet. Data source: twitter.com, accessed on 
11 November 2016.
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discrimination of advertisers.’ On social media, the situation is slightly dif-
ferent, but not necessarily better: on Facebook and Twitter, users can pay to 
promote postings. Facebook, Twitter and Google allow targeted ads. On Twit-
ter, it is also possible to promote trends. Figure 6.2 shows a promoted posting 
from Twitter.
Promoted posts show up on Twitter users’ news feeds, profiles or tweet detail 
pages. Figure 6.3 shows that on Twitter, targeting is not only possible based on 
gender, languages and devices, but also based on search keywords, followers of 
particular users, interests, TV shows, behaviours, and events. Figure 6.4 shows 
details of Twitter’s behavioural targeting feature.
On television, advertisers target particular audiences who watch specific pro-
grammes. In newspapers, they target the typical reading audience. On social 
media, multiple audiences can be targeted at once because there are micro and 
niche publics. This makes the logic of advertising different on social media than 
in traditional media. The overall effect is an online advertising-user-spiral, in 
which more and more advertising revenue shifts from print to digital due to 
the targeting possibilities. The advertising-circulation-spiral was first observed 
in the realm of newspaper advertising,21 but it certainly also contributes to 
the monopolisation of online markets. In 2015, the finance and insurance 
 industry, followed by the retail industry, comprised the largest share of ad 
 spending on Google. Amazon was the largest advertiser with investments of 
US$ 157 million.22 In 2013, Samsung was with US$ 100 million the biggest 
advertiser on Facebook.23
FPO
Fig. 6.3: Targeting of ads on Twitter.
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The discussion shows that online advertising acts as a filter in several ways: 
(i) It allows large transnational corporations with large ad budgets to confront 
a large targeted audience with content and ads; (ii) Regular content becomes 
ever more difficult to discern from advertising. There is no clear temporal or 
spatial differentiation. Corporations are interested in native online advertising 
and branded online content as it allows them to deceive users and to almost act 
like news media, effectively undermining the independence of reporting. Com-
panies can increase reach via social media; (iii) The online advertising-user-spiral 
increases social media’s power in advertising and news-making and advances 
monopoly tendencies in the online economy; (iv) An important fourth dimen-
sion that needs to be added which Herman and Chomsky do not discuss is that 
advertising means exploitation of audience labour.24 On social media, users’ digi-
tal labour produces a data commodity and is exploited by the platforms for sell-
ing targeted ad spaces.25
2.3 Sourcing
Colin Sparks argues for an extension and refining of the PM: 
The central departure from the classical formulations of the PM is 
that, in place of the stress it gives to the uniformity of the media, we 
now expect to find diversity. The divided nature of the capitalist class, 
the presence of powerful critical currents which find legitimate public 
expression in a capitalist democracy, the need to address the concerns 
Fig. 6.4: Behavioural targeting on Twitter.
FPO
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of a mass audience, political differentiation as a marketing strategy, all 
point to the necessity for any viable media system to include a range of 
different opinions. […] Of course, it is entirely true that the range of dis-
senting voices is carefully controlled. There tends to be a preponderance 
of elite voices, and those in turn will tend to reflect the views of power-
ful groups in economics and politics. […] Sometimes, however, radical 
individuals do get regular exposure in the media […] partly at least for 
the good business reason that it fits the marketing strategy of particular 
media to attract the substantial number of radical individuals towards 
their niche in the market.26
Des Freedman27 discusses the example of the British tabloid the Daily  Mirror 
that during the 2003 Iraq war substituted its usual focus on celebrities and 
scandals with an anti-war campaign. The example shows that also mainstream 
media, especially in situations of crisis, can take alternative positions, and that 
such exceptions matter. Freedman argues for giving attention to ‘both structure 
and agency, contradiction and action, consensus and conflict.’28 Herman and 
Chomsky acknowledged the possibility for diversity: ‘The mass media are not a 
solid monolith on all issues.’29
Sourcing as a filter is different online than in broadcasting because the inter-
net has a decentralised and global architecture. Manuel Castells30 argues that 
the internet allows mass-self-communication, which means that a larger num-
ber of producers online as compared to the broadcast model can reach a larger 
audience. The basic difference between computer networks and broadcasting 
is that the network is a universal machine, at once a technology or production, 
distribution and consumption. Combined with its global reach and significant 
bandwidth rates, this allows the phenomenon of user-generated content. User-
generated content does however not automatically imply political plurality and 
diversity. The key question about communication power shifts from the control 
of production towards the control of attention and visibility. Attention and vis-
ibility, however, also need to be produced and are thus aspects of production. 
Gaining online attention and visibility requires money, time and labour-force. 
Everyone can in principle produce content online, but in a capitalist society 
only a minority attracts online visibility and attention.31
A first online asymmetry concerns the fact that ‘the traditional media them-
selves have occupied the internet and are dominant news providers there; […] 
they have the resources and pre-existing audiences to give them a huge advan-
tage over alternative media potential rivals.’32 In November 2016, the most 
popular online news site was CNN.com. While CNN was on 11 November, 
2016, the 72nd most accessed website in the world, the independent news sites 
alternet.org and democracynow.org were only ranked in positions 5,967 and 
9,493 respectively on the list of the world’s most accessed websites.33 Notwith-
standing, alternative online media certainly attract significant audiences. At the 
same time, they tend to face resource problems because they are not organised 
as capitalist businesses.
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Second, money is an important factor in attaining online visibility and attention. 
It is possible to boost one’s online attention by buying likes, followers, re-tweets, 
etc. Figure 6.5 shows an example of a company that sells Facebook followers. Users 
with a budget to spend can buy more visibility online. If your number of followers 
is large enough, then it is also more likely that others start following you because 
there are reputational hierarchies and the artificially inflated number of likes, re-
tweets and followers is a form of psychological impression management.
Third, there are reputational inequalities. Social media attention is highly 
stratified. A small elite group of users dominates online visibility and  attention.34 
As an example, table 6.1 shows the Facebook pages that have the largest  number 
of fans.
The data indicate that corporations and entertainment dominate social media 
attention. News and information therefore tend to focus on popular topics. 
Fig. 6.5: An example for online attention as commodity. Data source: http://
www.followersandlikes4u.com.
Rank FB Page Number of Fans Type
1 Facebook for Every iPhone 500 300 326 App
2 Facebook 174 559 960 Corporation
3 Cristiano Ronaldo 117 252 364 Footballer 
4 Shakira 104 416 196 Musician
5 Vin Diesel 100 378 269 Actor
6 Coca-Cola 99 713 570 Brand, corporation
7 FC Barcelona 94 669 625 Football team
8 Read Madrid C.F. 92 645 690 Football team
9 Eminem 91 308 332 Musician
10 Leo Messi 87 147 610 Footballer
Bernie Sanders 4 653 316 Politician
Karl Marx 1 450 139 Political theorist
Table 6.1: The most popular pages on Facebook. Data source: https://www.
socialbakers.com, http://www.facebook.com, accessed on 12 November, 2016.
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 Politics is less visible and more marginalised. Bernie Sanders and Karl Marx, 
two symbols of left-wing politics, have significantly fewer fans. In an interview, 
 Herman and Chomsky point out this development: ‘[M]uch of the new media on 
the internet is oriented toward facilitating social connections, with politics sec-
ondary at best, and the best of the new alternative media have limited resources 
and outreach and specialize in critical analysis rather than news-making.’35
The tabloidisation of social media is, however, just a tendency, not a deter-
minism or totality. Social movements often use social media because they are 
not adequately represented in the mainstream media. They tend to understand 
how to use online communication as a tool for political organisation well. The 
capitalist online public sphere is not totally, but predominantly, an entertain-
ment sphere, and only to a lesser extent is it a political public sphere.
Fourth, political bots play a role in online political communication. A bot is 
a piece of software code that performs certain online behaviour based on an 
algorithm. Examples are automatic tweets or re-tweets or the posting of images 
and texts from a database at particular times. The problem of bots in politi-
cal communication is that they can appear human-like, can distort attention, 
harass and scare people, etc. They are an expression of the online automation 
of human action, the replacement of humans by machines. There are concrete 
humans who own, control, and programme bots. So, whereas the political bot 
does not have political attitudes, morals and interests, its behaviour is shaped 
by human beings who have particular political interests.
Kollanyi, Howard and Woolley have analysed around 10 million tweets men-
tioning Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump around the time of the third US 
presidential election debate.36 They found that political bots posted 36.1% of the 
pro-Trump tweets and 23.5% of the pro-Clinton tweets. Given that political opin-
ion and sentiment analysis is increasingly conducted on Twitter and with the 
help of Big Data analytics, political bots can manipulate the public perception of 
public opinion. Considering that a certain degree of online politics is automated, 
political attitudes should probably not at all be measured with the help of Big 
Data analytics. Political bots, Big Data analytics and computational social science 
methods can colonise, distort, instrumentalise and manipulate the public sphere.
2.4 Flak/Mediated Lobbying
Herman and Chomsky do not properly explain the name of the fourth dimen-
sion: Flak. This German term stems from military jargon. The Nazis used Flak 
as an abbreviation for Fliegerabwehrkanone. In a comprehensive overview, Joan 
Pedro suggests to speak of ‘countermeasures to discipline the media’37 instead 
of flak. We could also simply speak of mediated lobbying attempts.
Herman and Chomsky define flak the following way: ‘‘‘Flak” refers to nega-
tive responses to a media statement or program. It may take the form of letters, 
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telegrams, phone calls, petitions, lawsuits, speeches and bills before Congress, 
and other modes of complaint, threat, and punitive action. It may be organized 
centrally or locally, or it may consist of the entirely independent actions of indi-
viduals.’38 In the digital age, lobbying for certain interests has been extended to 
social media and is no longer simply aimed at centralised media organisations, 
but now aims to directly transmit political messages to as many internet users 
as possible.
At the time of the 2011 Arab Spring and the subsequent Occupy movements, 
there was much euphoria about protest and revolutionary movements’ use 
of social media for public engagement and political organisation.39 After the 
world economic crisis had started in 2008, it seemed like revolution was pos-
sible. The role of social media in revolutions and protests was often overstated. 
Empirical analysis shows that in protests, social media communication tends 
to interact with other forms of political communication, especially face-to-
face-communication.40 Revolutions and protests are not virtual, but take place 
offline and online simultaneously.
Political groups and movements from all parts of the political spectrum uti-
lise the internet and social media for political communication. The example 
of political bots mentioned in the previous section shows that both support-
ers of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton used bots for trying to boost their 
candidate’s popularity. Automated lobbying is a particular form of flak in the 
digital age.
In the early days of the internet, sometimes the impression was conveyed that 
left-wing and green movements such as the Zapatista solidarity campaigns were 
very skilled at utilising the internet for political communication because they 
are grassroots organisations and that far-right groups were very bad at it due 
to their hierarchical leadership ideology. The basic argument was that grass-
roots movements as well as the internet have a flat and decentralised structure 
and therefore are suited for each other. This assumption underestimates the 
internet’s social hierarchies and power structures that are not technically deter-
mined. Today right wing lobbying is a large-scale affair on the internet.
In November 2016, Hillary Clinton had 10.9 million Twitter followers, while 
Donald Trump had 14.6 million. French President François Hollande had 1.78 
million followers, the National Front leader Marine Le Pen 1.18 million. In the 
UK, left-wing Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn had 662k followers, Nigel 
Farage 516k.41 The data indicate that right-wing groups and individuals are at 
least just as active and popular on social media as left-wing activists and groups.
Figure 6.6 shows a typical tweet by Donald Trump. It achieved a high number 
of likes and re-tweets: More than 7,500 likes and 20,000 re-tweets. The example 
shows that right-wing politics today to a significant extent takes place online 
and on social media.
Right-wing lobbying is not limited to established parties and politicians, but is 
to a significant degree carried by right-wing social movements. The alt-right 
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movement is a far-right movement that is predominantly active on the internet. 
It is racist, white supremacist, anti-Semitic, homophobic, anti-feminist, and 
Islamophobic. It uses social media, internet memes, and right-wing sites such 
as Breitbart News. Donald Trump has appointed Breitbart’s executive chair-
man Steve Bannon as his White House chief strategist. The alt-right move-
ment uses hashtags such as #WhiteGenocide, #MAGA (Make America Great 
Again), #ccot (Conservative Christians on Twitter), #tcot (Top Conservative 
on Twitter), #WhiteSupremacist, #AltRight, #AntiWhite, #WhiteLivesMatter, 
#WarOnWhites, #NRx (Neoreaction). The Guardian has reported that Trump 
supporters spread fake news stories and conspiracy theories about Hillary Clin-
ton on social media.42 Empirical research confirms such tendencies.43 As dia-
lectical counter-pole to the fact that there are fake online stories, one must also 
stress that fact-checking organisations that work on professionally revealing 
truths and falsehoods have emerged. They are organisations such as the Inter-
national Fact-Checking Network.
The Norwegian Nazi terrorist Anders Breivik was quite digitally savvy. He 
gathered information online, purchased weapons and bomb equipment online, 
was an online gaming enthusiast (World of Warcraft, Call of Duty) participated 
in far-right discussion fora such as Stormfront, nordisku.nu and document.no, 
Fig. 6.6: A tweet by Donald Trump. Source: twitter.com.
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gathered more than 9,000 friends on Facebook, and spread propaganda videos 
with the help of YouTube and Vimeo.44
Even if we do not like it, fascism and right-wing extremism on social media 
are to a significant degree public forms of communication. They constitute 
a reactionary public sphere that is mediated by the internet, social media, 
mobile communication, etc. The point is to create a political climate in soci-
ety that advances democratic and civil public spheres, which is however not 
just an issue that concerns how we communicate. It is also a political task 
that needs to aim at overcoming inequality, discrimination exploitation and 
domination in society. Online fascism is online communication that aims to 
advance creating a fascist society by spreading hatred, prejudices, authori-
tarian populism, friend/enemy propaganda, and fetishist political ideology. 
Right-wing extremism online appropriates certain elements of fascism (e.g. 
hatred against immigrants and refugees, anti-Semitism, anti-socialism, etc.) 
in online speech.
In an interview Herman and Chomsky argued that right-wing media, 
including Fox News, right-wing talk radio and blogs, form ‘a right-wing attack 
machine and echo-chamber.’45 In the current political climate of nationalism, 
racism, xenophobia and elements of fascism, social media is certainly a right-
wing attack machine. It must, however, also be seen that the political left is 
skilled at using social media, which maintains online politics as a contradictory 
space.
2.5 Ideologies
Ideology is a complex term with many meanings that range from individual 
or collective meanings or worldviews to the notion of false consciousness.46 
The advantage of a critical notion of ideology over a general one is that it 
allows normative judgements about how a good society looks like. Her-
man and Chomsky speak of neoliberal ideology,47 Western ideology,48 anti- 
Communist ideology,49 the national-security ideology,50 right-wing ideol-
ogy,51 and the ideology of national security.52 But they never define the term. 
Ideology can in a critical manner be understood as a semiotic process in 
which humans practice the production and spreading of information, mean-
ings, ideas, belief, systems, artefacts, systems, and institutions that justify or 
naturalise domination and exploitation.53 Ideology is the semiotic level of 
domination and exploitation.
In times of crisis, it is highly likely that all sorts of ideologies are expressed 
and challenged in public communication. There are both ideologies of the 
internet and ideologies on the internet. Ideologies of the internet are a form of 
public communication that fetishises instrumental control of online communi-
cation. It is instrumental communication about instrumental communications, 
a meta-form of communication that justifies and defends the application of 
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instrumental reason to the internet. Neoliberal ideologies of the internet pre-
sent the online world as a frontier for investments that create a better world. 
They leave out questions of inequality, digital labour, class and exploitation. An 
example is that Google describes itself as showing that ‘democracy on the web 
works,’ reducing democracy and participation to the issue that ‘Google search 
works because it relies on the millions of individuals posting links.’ Questions 
relating to the secrecy of Google’s search algorithm, its monopoly power in 
the search market, users and employees’ lack of control of its means, etc. are 
not asked. State ideologies of the internet justify state surveillance, censorship 
and control of the internet and leave out questions of privacy and freedom of 
speech.
Britain’s Prime Minister Theresa May said that without advanced surveil-
lance capacities and technologies, ‘we run the risk that murderers will not be 
caught, terrorist plots will go undetected, drug traffickers will go unchallenged, 
child abusers will not be stopped, and slave drivers will continue their appall-
ing trade in human beings.’54 Compare this quote to Donald Trump’s tweet 
in figure 6.6. Both present society as being full of illegal immigrants, crimi-
nals, drugs, terrorism, child abuse, slavery, and other dangers. The ideological 
trick is to first create the impression of ubiquitous danger and to then call for 
quick fixes by calling for deporting or locking up or monitoring scapegoats, 
enhancing the use of surveillance technologies, etc. The problem is that there 
is no technological fix to political and socio-economic problems. Categorical 
suspicion turns the presumption of innocence into a presumption of guilt so 
that certain humans are automatically considered terrorists and criminal until 
proven innocent.
Ideology on the internet is the phenomenon of fascism, racism, right-wing 
extremism, nationalism, classism, sexism, anti-Semitism, etc. online. Given 
that right-wing ideology is flourishing in many societies, it is also exceed-
ingly present online and on social media. Ideology on the internet tends to 
make use of visual means and tabloidisation (simplification, using few words, 
emotionalisation, scandalisation, polarisation, banalisation, manipulation, 
fabrication, etc.). User-generated ideology is the phenomenon that ideology 
production is no longer confined to professional ideologues, but has become 
possible on the level of everyday life. Ideologies are sensational, populist, 
simplistic, emotional, and speak directly to particular subjects. Because of 
these features, online ideology tends to attract a lot of attention. Algorithms 
reward those who gain significant levels of attention by helping to further 
amplifying them. Therefore, there is a tendency of algorithmic amplification 
of online ideologies.
The 2016 Austrian presidential election saw a run-off between far-right 
 candidate Norbert Hofer representing the Freedom Party of Austria and the 
Green Party candidate Alexander Van der Bellen. Hofer’s supporters  mobilised 
especially on Facebook, where they often spread violent threats against Van 
der Bellen, refugees, immigrants, and others. An analysis of such  comments 
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showed that the important elements of political communication were: 
(1) authoritarian populism guided by the leadership principle, (2) nationalism, 
(3) the friend/enemy scheme, and (4) militancy and violent threats.55
Herman remarks that the ‘fifth filter – anti-communist ideology – is pos-
sibly weakened by the collapse of the Soviet Union and global socialism.’ The 
situation has again changed since with various Occupy movements, Jeremy 
Corbyn, Bernie Sanders, Syriza, Podemos, etc., once again putting the idea of 
socialism on the political agenda. We see both liberal and right-wing main-
stream media in Britain waging an ideological war against such people and 
movements. As an example, a study of journalistic representations of Jeremy 
Corbyn found that in 89% of 812 analysed news stories, Corbyn’s views were 
absent, distorted or challenged. Forty-three per cent of all stories ridiculed or 
personally attacked Corbyn. The study concludes that ‘the degree of viciousness 
and antagonism with which the majority of the British newspapers have treated 
Corbyn is deemed to be highly problematic from a democratic perspective.’56 
Another study showed how anti-socialist ideology directed against Corbyn also 
spread on Twitter and was organised as a red scare 2.0.57 ‘In the analysed data-
set, users for example argued that because of being left-wing, Corbyn is loony, 
an extremist and dangerous (compressed general ideology), is a friend of ter-
rorists, radicals and dictators and thereby supports Britain’s enemies (foreign 
policy discourse topic), wants to create a state-controlled economy that will 
result in poverty and deprivation for all (command economy-discourse topic), 
wants to create a totalitarian state like Stalin or Mao did (authoritarian and 
totalitarian politics discourse politics), and is an old, badly dressed, vegetar-
ian, bike-riding loony-left hippie with a beard (culture and lifestyle discourse 
topic). The foreign policy, command economy, and lifestyle-discourse topics 
were also prominently featured in the right-wing media. User-generated ideol-
ogy on Twitter in these cases is closely related to ideologies spread by the mass 
media. It copies the latter’s contents by linking to articles, using certain head-
lines or biased phrases such as ‘the Loony Left’ and at the same time feeds these 
media by showing that there is an interest in and positive response to stories 
that scapegoat the Left.’58
But social media and society are not exclusive terrains of the right. There is 
always the potential for contestation. The same study showed that left-wing 
activists can challenge ideology by characterising those attacked in positive 
terms, using satire, humour, sarcasm, provide links and arguments showing 
the world’s complexity and contradictions, argumentative dialectical reversals. 
Such strategies tend to be smart, complex, and dialectical.
3. Assessment
Table 6.2 summarises the discussion of the online propaganda model.
On the one hand it seems like the propaganda model is also relevant in 
the online world because we continue to live in a society shaped by class 
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and domination. On the other hand, the model also needs to be adapted 
and extended because of particular features of digital capitalism and digital 
media.
Above we have discussed the role of algorithms that partly automate propa-
ganda in the form of intransparent search and ranking algorithms as well as 
political blogs. Native advertising and branded content enhance the power of 
corporations and enable them to displace journalism’s autonomy and to present 
product propaganda as editorial content. A further differentiation that must be 
taken into account is that in computer networks and on networked computers, 
the production, diffusion and consumption of information converges. Audi-
ences become users and prosumers (productive consumers). This model is dif-
ferent from the broadcast model of communication. Power asymmetries are, 
however, not automatically sublated, but further complicated. Another impor-
Dimension Internet
Size, Ownership, 
Profit Orientation
Concentrated social media markets, concentrated  ownership, 
intransparent and secret algorithms that determine the 
 priorities of how results and news are presented
Advertising Transnational corporations are able to confront users with 
targeted ads and content;
Native online advertising and branded online content threaten 
news-media’s-independence;
The online advertising-user-spiral increases social media’s 
power in advertising and as news media and advances 
 monopoly tendencies in the online economy;
On social media, users’ digital labour produces a data 
 commodity and is exploited by the platforms in order to sell 
targeted ad spaces
Sourcing Traditional news organisations are powerful actors in online 
news;
Online attention as commodity manipulates political 
 communication;
Corporations and entertainment dominate social media 
 attention;
Political bots distort the political public sphere
Flak, Mediated 
Lobbying
Bots and other tools for automated lobbying;
Social media use by politicians, parties, movements;
Online hate speech
Ideologies Ideologies of the internet;
Ideologies on the internet and user-generated ideologies;
Algorithmic amplification of online ideologies
Table 6.2: The Online Propaganda Model (PM).
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tant aspect is that we should always think of potentials for resistance and study 
actual oppositional developments.
I find the PM a useful model for the analysis of power structures in media 
systems, as this chapter demonstrates. But we also need a further refinement 
and extension that brings us beyond the PM and takes critiques of capitalism, 
anti-democratic elements of state power, acceleration, etc. into account when 
analysing media systems. There is a range of topics, such as the exploitation of 
labour and surveillance, that relates to (digital) media that need to be critically 
analysed.59 Wherever there are communications systems in capitalism, there 
are also workers. And a specific share of them is exploited in class relations. 
In the production of digital media, there is an international division of digital 
labour in which we find diverse workers, such as African slave-miners, Chi-
nese hardware-assemblers working at Foxconn, highly paid and highly stressed 
software engineers, precarious clickworkers and call centre agents, online free-
lancers, precarious creative workers, social media user-workers, etc.60 Edward 
Snowden unveiled the existence of a surveillance-industrial internet complex, 
through which secret services bulk-monitor users’ online activities, which has 
resulted in concerns about the violation of basic rights. Social media are accel-
erated, high-speed media. Nobody can read all tweets posted about an impor-
tant topic. Tweets and online information flow at such a speed that there is no 
time for real debate and controversy. Postings tend to be short, entertaining, 
and superficial. Online brevity provokes superficiality and the negation of the 
world’s complexity. Online communication tends to take place in fragmented 
and isolated publics, filter bubbles, and echo chambers that lack constructive 
controversy.
All of these problems are not problems of propaganda but of power in gen-
eral. We therefore need a model of power on social media. It needs to stress 
various dimensions, conflicts, and lines of potential struggle. For doing so, we 
also need a model of society. Society is the totality of communicative, social 
relations that take place in the context of dialectics of structure and agency. 
An understanding commonly used in sociology is that society and all social 
systems have three dimensions: the economy, politics, and culture. These are 
realms for the production of use-values (economy), collective decisions (poli-
tics), and meanings (culture). Any particular social system has an economic, a 
political and a cultural dimension. One of these dimensions may be dominant, 
which situates this social system in a particular subsystem of society. Table 6.3 
shows the role of power structures in society in general and modern society in 
particular.
The internet and social media platforms are social systems. Power should there-
fore be analysed in the context of the economic, political and cultural  dimensions. 
Modern society has a capitalist economy that is based on the  accumulation 
of monetary capital. It is, however, according to Pierre Bourdieu, also based 
on the accumulation of political (influence) and cultural power ( reputation). 
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Accumulation of power is the defining feature of modern society that there-
fore not only has a capitalist economy but also is a capitalist society. Table 2 
therefore also shows the forms that power take on in capitalist society.
Table 6.4 shows a theoretical model of power in digital capitalism.
As mentioned above, this model is based on a theoretical distinction between 
three realms of society: the economy, politics, and culture.62 It is also grounded 
in the philosophical dialectic of the subject and the object that contains three 
dimensions: human subjects, inter-subjective processes, and objective struc-
tures/social systems. Power in class societies is contradictory. It is organised 
in the form of economic, political and cultural contradiction. Which pole is 
more powerful under particular conditions is not pre-determined. Those who 
control resources normally tend to have power advantages. Given that there are 
structural contradictions, there is always the potential for actual social strug-
gles. These potentials are, however, not automatically realised.
Table 6.4 shows a power structure model for digital society that could also be 
more generalised for modern society as a whole, for class societies, etc. Herman 
and Chomsky’s PM covers some aspects of the power structure model, espe-
cially those that focus on politics, economy, the system, and dominant subject 
groups.
This chapter has shown that the PM remains relevant for the critical study of 
the internet, social media, and Big Data. Given the dialectical and historical 
character of both communications and society, we need to think of subjects, 
processes, objects, contradictions, the economy, politics, and culture, as well as 
the interaction of these dimensions, when analysing power in class societies.
Dimension of 
society
Definition of power Structures of power in modern 
society
Economy Control of use-values and 
resources that are produced, 
distributed and consumed. 
Monetary capital: Control of 
money and capital.
Politics Influence on collective decisions 
that determine aspects of the 
lives of humans in certain com-
munities and social systems.
Influence: Control of 
 governments, bureaucratic 
state institutions, parliament, 
military, police, parties, lobby 
groups, civil society groups, etc.
Culture Definition of moral values and 
meanings that shape what is 
considered as important, reputa-
ble and worthy in society.
Reputation: Control of 
 structures that define moral 
values and meanings in society 
(e.g. universities, religious 
groups, intellectual circles, 
opinion-making groups, etc.).
Table 6.3: Three forms of power.61
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